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In the culture war between the religious right and the secular left, much of the
fighting has been over how to teach sex education. Appearing ubiquitously in various
media outlets and academic commentary,1 the arguments have become quite familiar to
many Americans. The religious right contends that, in order to protect teenagers from
pregnancy and STDs, public high schools must encourage students to abstain from sexual
activity.2 And the secular left claims that because young people will have sex anyway,
whether or not they are taught sexual abstinence, public high schools must teach
teenagers how to engage in safe sex.3 What many Americans might not know is that in
some places the dispute about how to teach sex education is not yet relevant because the
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1
For a general (and enlightening) discussion of the history of the sex education conflict between the
religious right and secular left, see KRISTIN LUKER, WARRING VIEWS ON SEX—AND SEX EDUCATION—
SINCE THE SIXTIES: WHEN SEX GOES TO SCHOOL (W.W. Norton & Company 2006). For commentary on
the culture war, see JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (Basic
Books 1991), which led to the wide-use of the war analogy. Also, see NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD:
AMERICA’S CHURCH STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT (Farrar, Straus and Giroux
2005) for a treatment of the culture war’s religious elements.
2
The legislative enactment best expressing the Republican approach to sex education is the Adolescent
Family Life Act (“AFLA”), Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 578 (1981), codified at 42 U.S.C. 300z et seq. 103, an
Act sponsored by Republican Senators Orrin Hatch and Jeremiah Denton and designed to deprive the
comprehensive sex education movement of federal funding. According to UC Berkeley sociologist
Professor Kristin Luker, “AFLA is where the idea of ‘abstinence education’ made its debut on the national
scene.” LUKER, WARRING VIEWS ON SEX, supra note __, at 222. Abstinence sex education was formalized
as a Republican stance in 1988 when the Republic National Platform stated: “We oppose any programs in
public schools which provide birth control or abortion services or referrals. Our first line of defense . . .
must be abstinence education.” Id. at 18 n.5.
3
The Democrats expressed where they stand on the sex education issue in 1978 when Senator Edward
Kennedy led the expansion of comprehensive sex education. Id. at 221-22. Recently, in response to the
growing Republican attack on comprehensive sex education, the Democrats strengthened their attack on
abstinence education. In December of 2004, Representative Henry A. Waxman, a Democrat from
California, released a report providing examples of inaccurate information (e.g., “that HIV can be
contracted through exposure to sweat and tears”) included in federally funded abstinence-only sex
education programs. This report has bolstered the secular left’s argument against abstinence sex education.
See ACLU, Responsible Spending: Real Sex Ed for Real Lives, Feb. 18. 2005, at
http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/sexed/12622res20050218.html (last visited August 9, 2006).
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public schools have not answered the threshold question of whether to teach sex
education. This threshold question is the topic of this Article.
Most state legislatures do not require any of their public schools to teach sex
education,4 opting instead to leave the decision entirely to the local school boards.
Exercising this discretion granted from their state legislatures, many public schools
choose not to teach sex education. According to the Centers for Disease Control, 15.2%
of public high schools and 30.9% of public junior high schools do not require any STD
prevention education, including abstinence sex education.5 Although there is some
confusion as to precisely how many teenagers do not receive any formal sex education,
there is strong evidence that because a large percentage of public schools are not teaching
any sex education, many teenagers receive no formal sex education at all.6 Whatever the
actual numbers, the problem is that there is, undoubtedly, an n greater than zero. In other
words, there are some teenagers who become adults without formally learning anything
about STDs and pregnancy. These are the forgotten soldiers in the culture war over sex
education.

4

A 2004 study found that only twenty-two states require their public schools to teach sex education.
See Debra Surgan, Sexuality, Gender and Curricula, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 343 (2004).
5
CENTERS FOR DISEASE AND PREVENTION, FACT SHEET SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASE
PREVENTION FROM CDC’S HEALTH POLICIES AND PROGRAMS STUDY 2000, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/shpps/factsheets/pdf/stdprev.pdf.
6
As indicated above, the CDC reports that 15.2% of public high schools and 30.9% of public junior
high schools do not require any STD prevention education. However, between 95 and 97 percent of
teenagers report having some sex education. LUKER, WARRING VIEWS ON SEX, supra note __, at 251.
Since almost all sex education includes information about STD prevention (indeed, any discussion of
abstinence or condoms is included in the CDC numbers), these discrepant data seem irreconcilable. This
discrepancy might be due to a liberal interpretation of what constitutes sex education. There is support for
this explanation; according to a 1999 Kaiser Family Foundation survey, “three out of four of those actually
charged with teaching sex said that in their schools, the subject was covered in only a few class periods,
sometimes as few as one.” Id. If students consider one class dedicated to sex education as sufficient to
count as sex education, a short and superficial sexual or anatomical lesson probably counts too. Thus,
while 95-97 percent of teenagers might learn the bare basics about sex in a classroom setting, the CDC is
probably right that as many as almost one out of every six public high school students and almost one out
of every three public junior high school students do not take a sex education class.
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That some people go through public education without receiving any sex
education is both troubling and surprising. It is troubling because widespread sex
education—either encouraging abstinence or safe sex—is probably necessary to solve the
problems resulting from uninformed teen sex.7 And it is surprising because an
overwhelming majority of citizens support some form of sex education.8 This makes for
a highly important and interesting question: Why don’t more public schools teach sex
education?
My answer to this question is that the U.S. Constitution is a factor in the
unwillingness of public schools to teach sex education.9 This claim is based on the
following two premises: (1) the U.S. Constitution certainly does not require public
schools to teach sex education; and (2) the U.S. Constitution arguably requires public
schools that teach sex education to exempt those students whose religious beliefs are
substantially burdened by sex education. To illustrate how these two premises might
weigh in a school district’s decision not to teach sex education, this Article is framed as
an analysis of a question to a school district attorney as to how the district should respond
to threatened constitutional litigation regarding sex education.

7

To determine sex education’s efficacy, the CDC assembled a panel of experts to synthesize 17 studies
on the subject. The research synthesis found that sex education has no negative effects (e.g., sex education
does not accelerate or increase sexual activity), and some sex education programs have positive effects
(e.g., some programs delay sexual activity and increase condom use). See NATIONAL EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION HEALTH INFORMATION NETWORK, SCHOOL-BASED HIV, STD, AND PREGNANCY PREVENTION
EDUCATION: WHAT WORKS?, at http://neahin.org/programs/reproductive/works/.
8
According to Professor Luker, though there has always been opposition to sex education, the
opposition has never been popular. Only the most conservative groups, like the John Birch Society, have
opposed all forms of sex education. In fact, Professor Luker writes, opinion leaders of almost every stripe
believed that sex education was the best response to the twin problems of teenage pregnancy and
HIV/AIDS.” LUKER, WARRING VIEWS ON SEX, supra note __, at 220.
9
Lest I leave the reader with the impression that this Article is yet another example of a constitutional
commentator reducing highly complex social, economic, and political issues to a matter of constitutional
law, I want to highlight here that my argument is that the Constitution is a factor—not the factor.
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Part I describes the hypothetical problem, which, I should note at the outset, is
based on real situations school districts face.10 According to this hypothetical, some
students and parents—the liberals in the culture war—favor sex education, but they live
in a district where the public schools do not teach sex education and in a state that does
not currently require its public schools to do so. So, in order to pressure the schools to
teach the subject, these students and parents claim that they have a constitutional right to
have their public schools teach sex education. Opposing these liberals are the
conservatives who claim that they have a constitutional right not to be taught sex
education.
Part II analyzes the constitutional dimensions of the problem.11 This analysis
branches into the two premises upon which my thesis is based: Part II.A analyzes the
constitutional arguments that parents and students might make for sex education; and Part
II.B considers the constitutional arguments that parents and students might make for
exemptions from sex education.
Based on the relative strengths of these constitutional arguments, Part III offers a
solution to the problem: not to teach sex education. After noting that this is not a
solution at all—in that it will not solve the social, health, and economic problems that
result when young citizens are uninformed or misinformed about sex—Part III parts from

10

In her excellent book on the sex education war, see LUKER, WARRING VIEWS ON SEX, supra note __,
Professor Luker draws upon twenty years of sociological research in four American communities.
Identifying some of the people in these communities will be helpful in concretizing the problem addressed
in Part I. When this is the case, I will direct the reader to Luker’s findings.
11
The reader should be warned here that Part II’s analysis is relentlessly descriptive—that is, it does
not weigh whether a particular outcome is right as a matter of policy, but rather limits the analysis to the
available arguments under the case law. Part II is framed this way for an important reason. A principal
idea explored in this Article is that not only is the Constitution not a solution to all our problems, as many
conservatives like Justice Scalia have noted, but the Constitution can also be a source of our problems. In
order to engage in meaningful dialogue about how to deal with this issue, we must be as descriptive as we
can in analyzing the problem, so that normative judgments do not conceal the problem’s existence.
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Part II’s descriptive format and briefly explores, as a normative matter, whether we
should break the constitutional constraints that lead public schools to make this
problematic decision. Given that applying act-utilitarianism12 to judicial decisionmaking
rarely makes for good jurisprudence, and, more importantly, that various American
political institutions have already acted to solidify these constraints, Part III concludes
that any practical solution to the problem must work from within, rather than against, the
constraints, and accordingly, the Part offers a sort of constitutional compromise
consisting of three proposals as to how, within these constraints, the government may
educate children and teenagers about sex. The Article ends with consideration as to how
the preceding discussion contributes to our understanding of the Constitution and those
charged with interpreting it.
I. A SCHOOL DISTRICT’S PROBLEM OF WHETHER TO TEACH SEX EDUCATION
Imagine you are a school district attorney in a state that does not require its public
schools to teach sex education. Students and parents in the district who want the public
high school to teach sex education have pressured your school district to institute
compulsory sex education. Based on sex education polls and research, many school
board members think that compulsory sex education is a good idea. However, after
hearing that the district might force their children to attend sex education classes, some
religious parents have threatened that they will challenge the constitutionality of any
compulsory sex education program.

12

Act-utilitarianism is the term philosophers use to describe an application of utilitarianism that
permits a departure from utilitarian rules when such a departure maximizes happiness. Rule-utilitarianism,
by contrast, adopts rules that maximize happiness and does not permit exceptions to such rules—even in
the instances when allowing for an exception would maximize happiness.
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To avoid this litigation, some board members have proposed allowing all students
who can show that sex education violates their religious beliefs to opt-out of sex
education class. This exemption clause, however, worries many board members and
parents. The district has not taught sex education precisely because there are so many
public school students whose parents vigorously oppose sex education. Given their
opposition, these parents will probably invoke the exemption clause, and given their
strongly held religious beliefs, they will do so successfully. Thus, a large percentage of
the students could be exempt from sex education class while the other students are
compelled to attend sex education class. Some board members worry that by giving
students different schedules on the basis of their religious backgrounds, the exemptions
could highlight the differences among different religious groups, thereby increasing the
likelihood of school violence. In addition, many conservative parents have expressed
concern that their opted-out children will feel alienated from their classmates,13 and many
liberal parents question the efficacy of a sex education program that exempts those
students who need the education most.14
Weighing the costs of the disorder and tension that exemptions might create
against the limited benefits of a sex education program where a large percentage of the
most information-starved students are exempt from class, the majority of the board
13

This is a common concern among sex education opponents. For example, Professor Luker explains
in her book how, in response to Jenny Letterman’s opposition to sex education, other families wonder why
Jenny doesn’t just have her child opt-out and go to the library while the other children attend sex education
class. Professor Luker writes that this opt-out suggestion angers Jenny just as much as Jenny’s refusal to
opt-out angers others. One reason why it angers Jenny so much is that “she thinks her son will feel weird
and different going to the library when everyone else stays behind.” LUKER, WARRING VIEWS ON SEX,
supra note __, at 27.
14
Many sex education supporters worry that parents who opt their children out of sex education will
not teach sex education adequately at home, and that as a result there will be some sexually uneducated
children in the community, who in turn will spread the risks of uninformed sex to others. According to
Melanie Stevens, a sex education supporter in Professor Luker’s field study, opt-outs are dangerous
because one ignorant child in the community puts “all of our precious, beautiful children . . . at risk of
death.” Id. at 30.
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believe that compulsory sex education with exemptions is a bad idea. For these board
members, the solution is either to institute compulsory sex education without an
exemption or to do nothing at all.
In response to the board’s failure to institute compulsory sex education, some
students and parents who support sex education have threatened to file lawsuits, claiming
that all public high schools are compelled by the U.S. Constitution to teach sex education.
Confused by the fact that both the supporters and the opponents of sex education
seem to think that the U.S. Constitution is on their side, the school board has come to
you, its attorney, with two questions that are critical to how it will respond to the
litigation threatened by these groups. One question is whether there is any merit to the
claim that the U.S. Constitution requires public high schools to teach sex education. The
other question is whether there is any merit to the claim that the U.S. Constitution
requires public high schools that teach sex education to exempt from class those students
whose religious beliefs are burdened by sex education.
II AN ANALYSIS OF THIS PROBLEM UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
A. Does the U.S. Constitution Require Public High Schools to Teach Sex
Education?
The three constitutional provisions that most strongly support the claim that
public high schools are required by the U.S. Constitution to teach sex education are: the
Free Speech Clause,15 the Due Process Clause in the 14th Amendment,16 and the

15

“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
16
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Establishment Clause.17 The arguments that students and parents can make under these
three constitutional provisions are analyzed below.
1. The Free Speech Clause
The Free Speech Clause expressly guarantees a right to speak. Because a
corollary of the right to speak is the right to know,18 the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
that the Free Speech Clause guarantees citizens a right to acquire information.19 Thus,
students might have a right to acquire sex information in public schools. Based on the
Supreme Court’s free speech jurisprudence, there are two ways the right to acquire sex
information might apply in public schools.
The stronger free speech right to acquire sex information in public school means
that when public schools make curricular decisions, they must consider the interests that
students have in acquiring sex information. This right probably translates into a public
high school student’s constitutional right to take sex education classes.
A weaker free speech right limits the power that public schools may exercise
when they deprive students of access to sex information. This right does not require
public high schools to teach sex education, but instead prohibits public high schools from
withdrawing sex information that they already have in their possession.
Following is an evaluation of the legal arguments for each right and an analysis of
the implications for public high school students.
a. The right to acquire sex information in the classroom

17

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 44 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that “the right to know
is the corollary of the right to speak”).
19
See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
18
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The strongest free speech right to acquire sex information means that public high
school students have a right to take sex education classes. Supporters of this right can
draw inspiration from Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No.
26 v. Pico.20 The dispute in Pico arose after the local school board decided to remove
controversial fiction books from the public junior high school and high school libraries.21
Some students and parents challenged this decision, arguing that because the Free Speech
Clause guarantees a right to acquire information,22 the school board violated the students’
free speech rights.23
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Brennan found that the school board
violated the Free Speech Clause.24 Justice Brennan reasoned that although public
schools may remove books from their libraries for many reasons, public schools may not
remove a book on the basis that it is controversial.25 While Justice Brennan addressed
only the removal of books from libraries, a court could extend Justice Brennan’s
reasoning to other media besides books and to locations outside of the library. To
persuade a court to extend this reasoning, our hypothetical sex education supporters could
make the following argument:
The right to acquire information in public schools should not be based on the
location in which students receive the information or the medium through which the

20

457 U.S. 853 (1982).
Id. at 858.
22
Id. at 859.
23
Id.
24
It should be noted that this proposition is dictum since the actual holding in the case was to remand
for development of the facts—that is, to determine why the library removed the books. Id. at 883-84.
25
Lower courts have interpreted Pico to mean that public schools may not deprive students of
information on the basis of the information’s controversial content. See, e.g., Monteiro v. Tempe Union
High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.5 (9th Cir. 1998) (interpreting Pico to mean that “students' First
Amendment right of access to information is violated when schools remove books from library in a
content-based manner”).
21
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information is passed because the right to acquire information under the Free Speech
Clause is based on the recipient’s interest in the information.26 By connecting one’s
interest in information with how much one values the information, sex education
supporters can argue that the strength of a student’s right to acquire certain information
should be based on how much the student values it. With informational value as the
primary criterion, sex education supporters can argue that it does not make sense to limit
the right to acquire information in public schools to a particular location or to a particular
medium.
Moreover, if the strength of this right is based on the informational value, then sex
information should receive more constitutional protection than the literary works at issue
in Pico. Because sex education is not only important to the intellectual development of
students, as the controversial books in Pico were, but sex information is also important to
the health of students, unlike the literary works in Pico, a public school should have less
discretion in depriving students of access to sex information than it has under Pico in
removing controversial works of fiction. Thus, not only are public schools prohibited
from depriving students of sex information in the library, but public schools are also
required to provide sex information in the classroom, and accordingly, public high
schools must teach sex education.
This argument, however, would prevail only if a court were to interpret Justice
Brennan’s plurality opinion in Pico so broadly that it applied to information transmitted
to students outside of the library. If, as is more likely, a court were to read Justice
Brennan’s opinion narrowly, so that it would apply only to the removal of library books,
a court could easily find that the Free Speech Clause does not guarantee a right to sex
26

See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).

10

education classes. Under a narrow reading of Pico, the Court’s other cases considering
the question of how much discretion public schools may exercise in regulating the
curriculum are more relevant than is Pico. Two important decisions in this respect are
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier27 and Epperson v. Arkansas.28
In Hazelwood, the Court held that a public school’s regulation of curriculumrelated speech does not raise free speech concerns if the regulation is "reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”29 Because Hazelwood means that students do not
have a right to express in the classroom anything that they want to express, Hazelwood
strongly suggests that students do not have a free speech right to take sex education
classes. Indeed, if public schools have the power to regulate what kind of information is
expressed in the classroom, as the Court held in Hazelwood, then it follows that public
schools have the power to regulate what type of information students acquire in the
classroom. So even if Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Pico were treated as binding
precedent, a court could read Pico in harmony with the Court’s holding Hazelwood to
rule that students do not have a free speech right to sex education.
Furthermore, Justice Black’s concurrence in Epperson provides ample support for
the proposition that there is no free speech right to sex education. In Epperson, the Court
held that Arkansas violated the Establishment Clause by endorsing a creationist
interpretation of human development.30 Justice Black’s concurrence pointed out that
Arkansas did not violate the Constitution simply by condemning natural science. Justice
Black reasoned that because “students do not have a constitutional right to learn a certain

27

484 U.S. 260 (1988)
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
29
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268-69.
30
Id. at 109.
28
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subject in public school,”31 a public school therefore may decide not to teach a subject
either because the subject is not a priority for the school, or because the school considers
the subject too controversial for public consumption.32 Thus, even if Arkansas wanted to
remove biology from the curriculum because it found the subject too controversial,
Arkansas could still do so without violating the U.S. Constitution.33
Notably, there is considerable tension between Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion
in Pico and Justice Black’s concurring opinion in Epperson. Whereas Justice Brennan’s
analysis in Pico focuses on the school’s motive for depriving students of access to
information, Justice Black’s opinion in Epperson disregards the school’s motive for
withdrawing information from the curriculum so long as that motive is not clearly
religious. The tension between these opinions is noteworthy because a court might look
to both Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion and Justice Black’s concurrence for guidance
when dealing with the question of whether the Free Speech Clause requires public
schools to teach sex education.
Even though Justice Black’s concurrence is the older of the two opinions, it is
probably more persuasive where a curricular decision is at issue, since, after all,
Epperson certainly speaks more directly than does Pico as to the power that the state may
exercise when making curricular decisions. Given that neither Epperson nor Pico
provide mandatory authority for a lower court,34 and that Epperson probably has more
persuasive authority with regard to curricular questions, a court would probably look to

31

Id. at 113.
Id.
33
Id.
34
Of course, a court could simply ignore both opinions, since neither Justice Black’s concurrence nor
Justice Brennan’s plurality is controlling precedent.
32
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Epperson more closely in determining whether students have a free speech right to sex
education.
Therefore, if a court were to read Pico narrowly so as to apply only to library
books, a court probably would hold that students do not have a free speech right to
acquire sex information in the classroom under Hazelwood and Epperson—no matter
how important that information might be to some students.
b. The right to acquire sex information in the school library
As discussed above, Pico can be stretched to apply to curricular decisions.
However, since Justice Brennan gave little indication that his opinion applied to
curricular decisions, a more faithful reading of his plurality opinion is that the Pico
applies only to a school’s decisions regarding school library books. If this reading were
to apply to school library books containing sex information (“sex information books”),
students might have a free speech right to acquire sex information in the school library.
This free speech right to acquire sex information in the school library could have
two meanings. One meaning is that public school libraries are not only prohibited from
getting rid of sex information books on the basis of their content, but are also obligated to
provide such books. Another meaning is that while public school libraries are prohibited
from removing sex information books on the basis of their content, public school libraries
do not have an obligation to provide any sex information books. Based on the facts at
issue in Pico, the latter interpretation is probably right.
In determining whether Pico means that public school libraries have an obligation
to provide any sex information books, a critical fact in the case is that the Island Trees
School District removed the books from the school’s library. Thus, the facts of the case
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did not involve the acquisition of books. In fact, Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion
suggests that there is a constitutional distinction between a public school’s decision not to
acquire books and a public school’s decision to remove books.35 Accordingly, a court
can hold that Pico creates an obligation on the part of public schools to provide
controversial books to students only after the school has acquired the controversial
books. This is indeed how many lower courts have interpreted Pico.36
Under this interpretation, public schools may not remove sex information books
already in the library’s possession on the basis of their controversial content, but public
schools may decide that they will never provide such books to students. Read in this
light, then, Pico is a powerful case for students in schools with libraries full of sex
information books; but Pico is of little value to students demanding sex information
books from public schools that have never provided them. In order to receive sex
information, these students in public schools that have never provided sex information
books need to point to an affirmative state educational obligation.
An important case in this respect is San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.37 In Rodriguez, parents claimed that unequal funding of public education38
violates the Equal Protection Clause “because [education] is essential to the effective
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Pico, 457 U.S. at 862 (noting that “[r]espondents have not sought to compel their school Board to
add to the school library shelves any books that students desire to read” but “[r]ather, the only action
challenged in this case is the removal from school libraries of books originally placed there by the school
authorities, or without objection from them”) (emphasis in original).
36
Lower courts have interpreted Pico to mean only that public schools may not remove certain books
from the library. See, e.g., Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.5 (9th Cir.
1998) (interpreting Pico to mean that “students' First Amendment right of access to information is violated
when schools remove books from library”).
37
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
38
The dispute in Rodriguez arose after Texas’ policy of basing local school expenditures on property
taxes resulted in schools in wealthy districts having much more money than schools in poor districts. Id. at
11-16.
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exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote.”39
To support this claim, the parents noted that if a person is not given the training to speak
and think intelligently, the rights to speak and vote are meaningless.40 Without
education, the marketplace of ideas is an empty market and the ballot is just a blank piece
of paper.
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell began his analysis by searching the text
of the U.S. Constitution for a right to public education.41 Justice Powell determined that
since there is no provision in the U.S. Constitution even suggesting such a right,42 the
only way the parents could prevail is if they could show that public education is
necessary to fulfill a textual right.43 Justice Powell rejected the argument as applied to
the plaintiffs because, even if public education is a nexus for free speech, Texas had not
destroyed that nexus by providing universal but unequal education.
At first glance, Rodriguez seems to invalidate the proposition that the government
is obligated to provide sex information under the Free Speech Clause. Surely, if the
government does not have the obligation under the Free Speech Clause to provide
education, then it must not have the greater obligation to provide information about a
specific subject.

39

Id. at 35.
Id.
41
Id.
42
It should be noted that there is an explicit right to education under some state constitutions. See,
e.g., CONN CONST., art. VIII § 1; MD. CONST., art. VIII § 1; N.J. CONST., art. VIII § 4; and N.D.
CONST., art. VIII §§ 1 and 2.
43
Notably, Justice Powell did not say that the parents would prevail if they made this showing. Rather,
he claimed that they would prevail only if they made this showing—that is, without a textual right, they
could not prevail any way other than making a nexus argument. And whether they would prevail by
making that argument was a question to be dealt with another day—i.e., when an education system was so
unequal that poor parents could not meaningfully exercise textual rights. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S at 35-37.
40
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Upon further examination, though, Rodriguez might mean that states have
affirmative educational obligations under the Free Speech Clause. Because Rodriguez
involved a dispute over a decision to provide universal but unequal education, there is
still an open question as to whether there is an obligation to provide universal education.
Moreover, the language of Justice Powell’s majority opinion indicates a limited
requirement to educate under the Free Speech Clause. Justice Powell stressed the fact
that although Texas did not educate all of its citizens to become active or astute political
participants, Texas did provide the information necessary for Texans to communicate and
vote.44 This education, Justice Powell found, was sufficient to meet the government’s
educational requirements mandated by the Free Speech Clause.45
Thus, the Court might have held differently had Texas completely denied all of its
citizens an entire category of information. So, while Rodriguez might have shut the door
for some educational obligations, Rodriguez might have left the door open for others.
Because Rodriguez indicates that the government might be required to teach citizens only
“the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech,”46 one can
still say after Rodriguez that the government may not deny its citizens information that is
fundamental to communication. In other words, the door remains open for an obligation
to provide information that is necessary to a citizen’s ability to speak to others.

44

Id. at 36-37 (stating that “[e]ven if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that
the present levels of educational expenditure in Texas provide an education that falls short”).
45
Id. at 37.
46
Id. (declaring that “[w]hatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system
occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no
basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where . . . no charge fairly could be made that the
system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the
enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.) (emphasis added).
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This door might still be open for sex education because sex education, arguably,
is more fundamental to communication than many general subjects that are considered
central to the high school curriculum. For example, sex education seems more
fundamental to communication than math. This might not be intuitively apparent. After
all, a basic understanding of math is probably necessary for a person to participate in the
marketplace. Nonetheless, it might be argued that sex education is more fundamental to
communication for the majority of American citizens because it is through sex education
that a person learns how to express to others how she feels about such fundamental
matters as her desire to procreate or her interest in remaining healthy. Moreover, by
bringing people a comfort with their identities, sex education facilitates a person’s ability
to speak to others. 47 For this reason, some rank the importance of sex education with the
three R’s.48 Viewed in this light, the idea that sex education is more fundamental to
communication than a general subject like math might be quite sensible. For many
people, lessons about health and family planning apply to daily communication, unlike
the forgotten lectures on sine curves.
This application of Rodriguez to sex education might strike many as specious.
Some might say that even if Rodriguez leaves the door open for some educational
obligations that are necessary to communication, Rodriguez must not require schools to
provide sex education because an understanding of sex is not necessary to
communication. Admittedly, there is much to be said for this critique, since people have
communicated for years without an understanding of sex. However, even if one rejects
47
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the argument that sex education is necessary to communication, it must be accepted that
sex education is of great importance to a person’s physical and psychological health,49
and it therefore follows that sex education is at least important to communication.
Because sex education might be important to rather than necessary to
communication, a court could find that while there is no affirmative obligation under
Rodriguez to teach sex education, the government has the lesser obligation to provide
access to sex information. If there is such an obligation, local libraries or public school
libraries might have an obligation to provide sex information. This might mean that if the
local library does not permit young people to gain access to sex information, then the
young people can argue that the government must give them access to sex information
elsewhere—perhaps in the public school library.
This shifting obligation from the local library to the public school library is
particularly relevant after U. S. v. American Library Association,50 in which the Court
upheld a congressional act forbidding public libraries receiving federal funding from
granting uninhibited Internet access to minors. After this decision, many minors might
not be able to acquire sex information on the Internet in their local public libraries. If
minors cannot acquire sex information from their local public libraries, Rodriguez might
require the government to provide some sex information in the public school library.
And, under Pico, if this sex information in provided in the form of books, the state may
not remove the books from the public school library on the basis of their controversial
content.
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2. The Due Process Clause
The Court has read the Due Process Clause to mean that the government may not
unreasonably burden the exercise of certain unenumerated privacy rights. Under this
reading of the Due Process Clause, students can argue that they have a constitutional
right to acquire sex information, and parents can argue that they have a constitutional
right to have their tax dollars used to inform their children about sex. The students’ due
process argument is explored in Part II.A.2.a, and the parents’ due process argument is
discussed in Part II.A.2.b.
a. A student’s constitutional right to make private decisions
Students can argue that they have a right to acquire sex information because they
have a due process right to make private decisions. If there is such a right to sex
information, this might mean that public schools are obligated to teach sex education, or
it might mean that public schools are required only to provide access to sex information.
Whatever the extent of the right, however, a due process right to sex information would
require public schools to provide a service.
That this right would require a governmental service is important because, to date,
the Court has not found a positive obligation in the Due Process Clause. Instead, the
Court has found only negative liberties—that is, the right to be free from unreasonable
governmental intervention when making decisions that implicate liberty interests.
Because the Court has found that citizens have a liberty interest in making private
decisions, the Court has ruled that citizens have a right to be free from unreasonable
governmental intervention when they make decisions regarding contraception,51
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abortion,52 and their sexuality.53 Thus, the strongest argument for a due process right to
acquire sex information connects the power to make these constitutionally protected
decisions with the acquisition of sex information.
Many have noted the tight analytical relationship between these decisions and sex
information. Professor Catherine J. Ross writes, “The right of minors to information
about sexuality and contraception flows analytically from the privacy right to obtain an
abortion without parental consent.”54 The freedom to choose is predicated on decisional
power, which requires information.55
This is significant in terms of a constitutional right to sex education because there
is strong evidence that students do not have access to accurate sex information outside of
school. Studies suggest that for two related reasons many students in the United States
do not have access to accurate sex education outside of school. One reason is that many
parents do not provide sex education at home.56 The other reason is that many
adolescents learn about sex from other adolescents. According to research, many
generations of American children have learned about sex from other children. A 1926
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study found that 80% of children received their sex information from other children.57
Amazingly, almost 60 years later, researchers found in a similar study that other children
are still the most common source of sex information for children.58 As these studies
suggest, the majority of students do not acquire sex information at home or school.59
Instead, most students acquire sex information from other students.
The problem with students acquiring sex information from other students is that
the information is often false. For example, it is a common myth among teenagers that a
girl cannot become pregnant the first time she has intercourse.60 Since some teenagers
acquire sex information only from other students, it is difficult for these teenagers to
verify sex information. Indeed, without a rudimentary understanding of human sexuality,
false sex information is virtually indistinguishable from true sex information.
Clearly, the constitutionally protected right to make private decisions about sex
does not mean very much if one needs sex information in order to make these decisions,
and if one’s only access to sex information is unverifiable and often false. Unfortunately,
this can be said for many American public school students—their constitutional right to
make private decisions about sex is not very meaningful because they cannot fully
exercise it.
Notwithstanding this unfortunate situation, students probably do not have a
constitutional right to acquire sex information under the Due Process Clause because the
Supreme Court has found that, so long as people can exercise the right to make private
decisions free from governmental intervention, the government does not impinge on the
57
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right by refusing to assist citizens in exercising the right. Under the Court’s
interpretation of the Due Process Clause, the mere existence of the right to make private
decisions, even without full exercise of that right, is sufficient. To understand why the
Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause this way, and to demonstrate how this
interpretation probably means that the government does not violate the Due Process
Clause if minors have a private means of acquiring sex information, it might be helpful to
examine how the Court has treated the government’s refusal to assist citizens in
exercising the constitutionally protected right to choose whether or not to have an
abortion.
Maher v. Roe61 was the first case in which the Court considered the relationship
between government benefits and the due process right to an abortion. The dispute in
that case arose after Connecticut denied its citizens Medicaid benefits for medically
unnecessary abortions. The Court found that because the government does not have an
obligation to assist women in exercising their right to have an abortion, Connecticut did
not violate the Due Process Clause by denying the use of government benefits for the
purpose of obtaining medically unnecessary abortions.
In Harris v. McCrae,62 the Court followed Maher’s reasoning by holding that the
federal government could refuse to fund abortions altogether. In McCrae, Justice Stewart
explained why, even though citizens have a constitutional right to choose whether or not
to have an abortion, the government does not have an obligation to fund abortions.
Justice Stewart pointed out that the Due Process Clause guarantees liberty, and that this
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guarantee of liberty does not require any governmental action.63 Instead, it protects
people from governmental action.64 Thus, even though the Due Process Clause
guarantees the right to have an abortion, “it simply does not follow [from Roe] that a
woman’s freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial
resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices.”65 Justice Stewart then
applied his understanding of the Due Process Clause to other privacy rights: “It cannot be
that because government may not prohibit the use of contraceptives [Griswold] or prevent
parents from sending their child to a private school [Pierce], government, therefore, has
an affirmative constitutional obligation to ensure that all persons have the financial
resources to obtain contraceptives or send their children to private schools.”66
The Court extended Justice Stewart’s reasoning in Rust v. Sullivan.67 In Rust, a
restriction on abortion counseling for people receiving federal family planning funds was
challenged as an unconstitutional interference with a woman’s right to an abortion.68 The
Court found that since the government is not obligated under the Due Process Clause to
assist citizens in exercising the right to have an abortion,69 the government may prohibit
government employees from providing abortion counseling.70
Notably, there were dissents in these abortion cases, claiming that if the
government does not assist people in exercising the right to have an abortion, the right to
have an abortion is meaningless for many women. In Rust, for example, Justice
Blackmun wrote that, “[b]y suppressing medically pertinent information and injecting a
63
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restrictive ideological message unrelated to considerations of maternal health, the
Government places formidable obstacles in the path of . . . freedom of choice.”71 Justice
Blackmun concluded that in effect “the Government will have obliterated the freedom to
choose as surely as if it had banned abortions outright.”72
Justice Blackmun’s dissent is similar to the point made above about the freedom
to choose being predicated on decisional power.73 Since this decisional power requires
information, the mere existence of the freedom to choose, without the information
necessary to choose, is meaningless in any practical sense. Applying this reasoning to
abortion, Justice Blackmun found that women who are unaware of the benefits and risks
of abortion cannot fully exercise their power to make the decision of whether or not to
have an abortion. Because these women might not know what will happen if they choose
to have an abortion, these women are unable to choose in any meaningful way whether or
not to have an abortion.
But, as the Court has pointed out in various contexts, the language of the Due
Process Clause does not support Justice Blackmun’s reasoning. While the text clearly
prohibits the government from depriving citizens of liberty, the text does not indicate that
the government is obligated in any way to protect citizens from other private actors
seeking to take away their liberty.74 In other words, the Clause does not guarantee
liberty; rather, the Clause guarantees that the government will not take away liberty.
Thus, the text does not suggest that the government has an obligation to inform women of
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the risks and benefits of obtaining an abortion. Indeed, just as the government does not
have an obligation to protect citizens from private actors, the government does not have
an obligation to protect uninformed women from their ignorance. So, although Justice
Blackmun’s dissent in Rust is logically sound in terms of what it means to exercise true
choice, Justice Blackmun’s analysis is not in tune with the tenor of the Due Process
Clause. Consistent with the text of the Due Process Clause, the Court has held repeatedly
that states do not have an affirmative duty to provide the services necessary for women to
choose whether or not to have an abortion.
Based on the Court’s textual interpretation of the Due Process Clause, minors do
not have a right to acquire sex information under the Due Process Clause. Just as women
are not protected from their ignorance, children are not protected from the
misinformation disseminated on the playground. And just as women are not entitled to
cost-free abortions, minors do not have a right to cost-free sex information. Thus, even if
the government burdens a minor’s private access to sex information, courts will
invalidate the impediment only if it effectively makes the information inaccessible. This
might be limited to situations when the government imposes a civil or criminal penalty on
the acquisition of the information. But when the government imposes a minimal burden
on the acquisition, such as when the government merely decides not to facilitate the
acquisition of the information,

courts will not find a due process violation. Thus, the

government’s obligations under the Due Process Clause are probably satisfied when it
refuses to provide sex education even if this mean that the only way teenagers can
acquire sex information is by private means, such as by buying books or renting videos.
This is true even if the costs of acquiring the information—i.e., paying money, enduring
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humiliation—place the information out of reach for some teenagers. So long as teenagers
can obtain sex information without fear of suffering a civil or criminal penalty, there is no
due process obligation on the government to inform students about sex so that they can
make constitutionally protected private decisions.
b. The right to raise one’s own child how one sees fit
Until this point, the discussion of the Due Process Clause has been limited to the
liberty interests of students in sex education. However, a public school also violates the
Due Process Clause if it violates the liberty interests of parents. Since parents are rarely
in a position to educate their children by themselves, the government acts as a surrogate
for parents in educational matters. In this role, the government may exercise discretion to
give effect to parental interests. However, the government’s interests and a parent’s
interests sometimes conflict. The Court ruled in Meyer v. Nebraska75 and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters76 that when there is such a conflict between the government and the
parent, the Due Process Clause limits the power that the government may exercise over a
child.
The analysis applied in Meyer and Pierce is pretty straightforward. A balancing
test is triggered when parental and governmental educational interests conflict. If the
government’s interests are not strong, the balance will swing in favor of the parent, as
75
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indicated in the Court’s decisions in Meyer and Pierce. As in all balancing tests,
however, the difficult part is in weighing the interests. In this respect, the facts of the
cases are helpful. From Meyer, for instance, we know that the government’s interest in
linguistic uniformity is too weak to trump a parent’s interest in having her child learn a
foreign language. And from Pierce, we know that the government’s interest in patriotism
is too weak to trump a parent’s interest in private education.
Thus, by comparing the interests that parents have in their children learning about
sex to the interests that parents have in their children learning foreign languages and
attending private schools, parents can argue that the Due Process Clause requires public
schools to teach sex education to their children.
In making this argument, parents can also emphasize how the government’s
refusal to teach sex education interferes with the private relationship between parents and
their children because the government’s refusal to teach sex education places the
educational responsibility on parents. This responsibility is especially burdensome in a
culture, such as ours, in which open sexual dialogue between parents and children is rare
and even taboo.77 Moreover, this burden is enhanced by the fact that many parents feel
that if public schools do not teach sex education, then they must instruct their children
about sex in order to protect their children from STDs and pregnancy. Accordingly, a
school’s failure to teach sex education makes some parents feel compelled to initiate
uncomfortable conversations with their children while their children are still young. To
avoid this discomfort, parents need public schools to educate their children in sexual
matters. And, so the argument goes, because the government’s interest in not teaching
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sex education is not very strong, the parental interests in having the government teach sex
education should prevail under Meyer and Pierce.
The problem with this argument is that it ignores the fact that there are also
parents who strongly believe that public schools should not provide sex education. Since
Meyer and Pierce protect the interests that all parents have in their children’s education,
Meyer and Pierce are limited to situations when the government can accommodate one
group of parental interests without impinging on another group of parental interests. That
Meyer and Pierce must be limited in this way is demonstrated by a brief examination of
what it would mean if conflicting parental interests did not limit Meyer and Pierce.
Let’s say one group of parents wants the government to do x and a second group
of parents wants the government to do y, and the goals achieved in doing x and y are
contradictory. And let’s also say that the government decides to do x, even though doing
x conflicts with the interests of the second group of parents. If conflicting parental
interests did not limit Meyer and Pierce, the second group of parents could argue that the
Due Process Clause requires the government to do y. But if the Due Process Clause
required the government to satisfy the interests of the second group of parents, and if in
doing so the government ignored the conflicting interests of the first group of parents, the
Due Process Clause would require the government to ignore the interests that the first
group of parents had in their children being educated a certain way.
If the Due Process Clause required this, the Constitution would require the
government to do precisely what the Constitution forbade the government from doing.
Unless we subscribe to a Godelian view of constitutional interpretation,78 the Constitution
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cannot require contradictory actions. Accordingly, Meyer and Pierce must be limited
when the government makes a decision in which parental interests conflict. In such
situations, the government must be free to make reasonable decisions, even if in making
those decisions the government ends up siding with one group of parents over another.
In light of the competing parental interests in the sex education debate, the
government’s decision to ignore the interests of parents who want sex education should
be permissible under Meyer and Pierce so long as the decision is either an effort to please
parents who oppose sex education or the reasonable judgment of the local school board.
Indeed, some lower courts have suggested that for this reason neither parents who support
sex education nor parents who oppose sex education may prevail in their claims under
Meyer and Pierce to challenge the government’s decision either to institute or not to
institute sex education.79 Thus, there is no due process claim under Meyer and Pierce
that parents can make for sex education.
3. The Establishment Clause
A final argument for sex education is that public schools violate the Establishment
Clause by deciding not to teach sex education. This is by good measure the weakest of
the constitutional arguments for sex education. Even assuming that the Establishment
Clause could be invoked to invalidate a decision that was not made, which is a generous
famous 1931 paper "On Formally Undecidable Propositions in Principia Mathematica and Related
Systems.” See KURT GODEL, COLLECTED WORKS, VOL. I: PUBLICATIONS 1929-1936 (Solomon Feferman
ed., Oxford University Press 1986). According to this theorem, axioms in a consistent system sufficiently
powerful to produce propositions will always produce propositions that cannot be proven to be consistent
by the system itself. Only under such a reflexive system can the Fourteenth Amendment require the
government to accommodate parental child-rearing interests when doing so violates other parental childrearing interests. For another example of how Godel’s incompleteness theorem might relate to
constitutional interpretation, see Jesse R. Merriam, Finding a Ceiling in a Circular Room: Locke v. Davey,
Federalism, and Religious Neutrality, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2006).
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assumption, it is extremely doubtful that under the Court’s existing Establishment Clause
doctrine, the Lemon test, a court would find that a public school violates the
Establishment Clause by making the decision not to teach sex education. This likelihood
goes from scant to zero when one considers how the Court’s unhappiness with the Lemon
test has led the Court to apply the test with a strong emphasis on the government’s
obligation to act neutrally towards religion.
However, despite the unlikelihood of finding that a public school that does not
teach sex education violates the Establishment Clause, it might be helpful here to
describe how a public school’s decision not to teach sex education could be analyzed
under the Lemon test and to explain how the issue could be analyzed under the Court’s
recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
In 1971, the Court announced an Establishment Clause test in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.80 Under this test, a governmental act violates the Establishment Clause if: (1)
the government’s purpose in the act is religious; or (2) the act’s primary effect advances
or inhibits religion; or (3) the act excessively entangles government and religion.81
Twenty-six years later, in Agostini v. Felton,82 the Court collapsed the “entanglement
prong” of the Lemon test into the “effects prong” by explaining that the factors used to
determine whether a government program excessively entangled the government with the
religion were the same as the factors used to examine the effect of the program.83 The
extent of that collapse is not important here, though, since there is no conceivable
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argument that a governmental institution is entangled with religion by not teaching sex
education. Thus, only the first two prongs merit discussion below.
Under the first prong of the Lemon test, sex education supporters could argue that
when a public school decides not to teach sex education, the public school’s purpose is to
promote religion. In the unlikely case that state decisionmakers were to reveal their
religious motives for deciding not to provide sex education, this would be an easy
argument. In such a case, sex education supporters could make a prima facie
Establishment Clause case by simply pointing to their religious motives.84
However, as we all know, many state decisionmakers disguise their religious
motives in secular rhetoric when they have religious motives for making decisions that
have religious overtones.85 Decoding the religious nature of the secular rhetoric poses
some difficulties. To do this, one would have to argue that despite the government’s
professed secular reasons for making the decision, there are religious forces at play.
Since this is very difficult to prove, courts rarely invalidate laws based on the first prong
of the Lemon test.
Making this argument in the sex education context particularly difficult is that
there are many secular reasons for not teaching sex education. For example, the
government might frame the issue in terms of health—an interest that the Court has found
to be secular even when the government uses religious organizations as the primary
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vehicle for its promotion. 86 This connection between a public school’s decision not to
teach sex education and the school’s interest in health is supported by research indicating
that sex discussion in the classroom makes it more likely that adolescents will have sex,87
and that adolescent sexual activity is psychologically and physically dangerous.88
Therefore, to prove that the government has a religious purpose for not having
public schools teach sex education, sex education supporters would have to argue that
although there are legitimate secular reasons for adopting this policy, these state
decisionmakers made the decision for religious reasons. This is impossible to prove
without clear evidence of the decisionmakers’ religious motives. Accordingly, sex
education supporters can make a strong case under the first prong of the Lemon test only
in the unlikely case that state decisionmakers were to reveal their religious motives for
deciding not to teach sex education. But in the likely case (the case in which the state
decisionmakers did not have any religious motives, did not reveal any motives, or
disguised their religious motives), the argument under the first prong is very weak.
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, sex education supporters can argue that
the promotion of religion is the primary effect of the government’s decision not to teach
sex education. This argument connects the values expressed in not teaching sex
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education with religious objectives. This is related to the argument that the
Establishment Clause prohibits public schools from teaching abstinence sex education—
an argument advanced by Gary Simson and Erika Sussman. 89 In making this claim,
Simson and Sussman draw on the close relationship between the Christian Coalition’s
objectives, and the effects that flow from a public school’s decision to teach abstinence
sex education.90
A similar argument can be made when a public school refuses to teach any form
of sex education. This argument would draw on the fact that many in the religious right
reject public sex discussion,91 and that a rejection of public sex discussion is precisely
what is achieved when a public school decides not to teach sex education.
This argument would not prevail because the Lemon test forbids only those
religious effects that the court finds to be primary—not those that are merely incidental.
Thus, the effect prong in the Lemon test cannot and does not mean that a state act is
unconstitutional simply because it coincides with a religious objective. Instead, the
effect prong means that a government act is valid when the effect of a government act is
both religious and secular. Since not teaching sex education has both a religious and
secular effect, there is no obligation on public schools to teach sex education under the
effect prong.

89

Gary Simson & Erika Sussman, Keeping the Sex in Sex Education: The First Amendment’s Religion
Clauses and the Sex Education Debate, 9 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 265 (2000).
90
Simson and Sussman point to the fact that "Sex Respect," the most widely used abstinence-only
curriculum in the United States, is modeled after religious manuals, encourages participation from the
religious community, and often incorporates religious beliefs. Indeed, many of the basic lessons of Sex
Respect—e.g., the sanctity of marriage, the immorality of abortion, the abnormality of homosexuality—are
based heavily on literal scriptural interpretation. Id. at 287.
91
For example, one religious right organization—Concerned Women for America—opposes “gay
rights, sex education, drug and alcohol education.” Concerned Women for America, Profile, at
http://rightweb.irc-online.org/org/cwa.php.

33

As described above, in order to prevail under the Lemon test, supporters of sex
education would either have to decipher government motives or connect the absence of a
sex education program to primarily religious objectives. Because accomplishing either of
these tasks would be quite difficult, prevailing under the Lemon test would be almost
impossible.
Making matters more difficult, the Court has modified the scope of the
Establishment Clause by emphasizing in many cases that the Establishment Clause does
not require complete separation between religion and government, but rather that the
Clause requires the government to act neutrally towards religion.92 Applying this
neutrality requirement to government funding, the Court has found that the government
may fund religious organizations so long as the government does not discriminate on the
basis of religion and the effect of the act is not inherently religious.93
If a court were to apply this neutrality requirement to the government’s decision
not to teach sex education, it would be virtually impossible to find an Establishment
Clause violation. One, the government does not discriminate on the basis of religion
when it decides not to teach sex education. Two, the decision not to teach sex education
is not an inherently religious decision; indeed, because there is research connecting
adolescent sex to real secular harms, the basis for making the decision is not inherently
religious. Therefore, even in the unlikely case that it could be proven either that the
92

Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the
Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771 (2001).
93
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government had a religious purpose for not teaching sex education or that that the
government achieved religious objectives by not teaching sex education, it would be very
difficult for sex education supporters to succeed in using the Establishment Clause to
compel a public school to teach sex education.
B. Are Some Students Constitutionally Entitled to Exemptions from Sex
Education?
Let’s say that, even though the Constitution certainly does not require it do so,94
our hypothetical school district decides to institute compulsory sex education. The
question, then, is whether those students who oppose sex education for religious reasons
are entitled under the Free Exercise Clause to exemptions from sex education.95
1. The Status of Wisconsin v. Yoder after Employment Division v. Smith
Before the Court decided Employment Division v. Smith,96 the government had to
carve an exemption from a law that substantially burdened a citizen’s exercise of her
sincerely held religious belief97--that is unless the government could show that denying
an exemption was necessary to serve a compelling state interest.98 It was under this preSmith standard that the Court held in Wisconsin v. Yoder99 that Amish students were
entitled to exemptions from a Wisconsin compulsory school attendance law. Since Yoder
94
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provides the strongest argument for students and parents seeking exemptions from
compulsory sex education, and since Smith radically changed free exercise doctrine,
determining the status of Yoder after Smith is critical to an analysis of the strength of their
argument for exemptions.
In Smith, the Court upheld an Oregon law that prohibited the use of peyote.
Although the law substantially burdened the exercise of a Native American religious
ritual, the Court held that the law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the
law applied to the general population and because the government did not target a
religious practice or religious group in passing the law.100 The Court has applied Smith
to mean that laws that incidentally burden religious exercise, no matter how much, are
presumptively valid and therefore do not need to satisfy strict scrutiny.101
Under the post-Smith standard, compulsory sex education does not violate the
Free Exercise Clause. So long as the program applies to all schoolchildren, and so long
as the program does not target any religious group or practice, it is religion-neutral and
generally applicable. And as such, the program is presumptively valid under Smith.
Accordingly, students and parents do not seem to have a constitutional right under the
post-Smith Free Exercise Clause to an exemption from compulsory sex education.
Indeed, some lower courts have held just that.102
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Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (invalidating a
Hialeah ordinance that targeted a religious group’s practice of animal sacrifice). It should be noted that
pre-Smith strict scrutiny still applies under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) when federal
laws substantially burden religious exercise. In addition, laws passed in states with their own RFRAs are
subject to strict scrutiny when they substantially burden religious exercise.
102
See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting a Free
Exercise Clause challenge to sexually explicit public school assembly because the school’s decision to have
the assembly was neutral and generally applicable).
101

36

However, students and parents seeking exemptions from compulsory sex
education might prevail under the stricter standard established in Yoder. For the Yoder
standard to apply to their claim, however, students and parents seeking exemptions must
first demonstrate that Yoder survives Smith. In this respect, an important part of the
Smith opinion is the section dealing with “hybrid situations.”
Writing for the majority in Smith, Justice Scalia tried to explain why the Smith
Court applied a lower standard than the Court had applied in previous free exercise cases.
In explaining one category of the Court’s previous free exercise cases, Justice Scalia
claimed that a higher free exercise standard applied to cases that presented hybrid
situations. According to Justice Scalia, a hybrid situation arises when a law substantially
burdens both a person’s religious exercise and another constitutional interest.103 When
there is a hybrid situation, a higher standard than the Smith standard applies even when
the law is religion-neutral and generally applicable.
Justice Scalia claimed in Smith that this hybrid exception explains why the Court
applied a higher standard to the religion-neutral and generally applicable law at issue in
Yoder. Since the compulsory school attendance law at issue in Yoder both substantially
burdened the Amish parents’ sincerely held religious beliefs and impinged upon their
constitutional interest in rearing their children how they saw fit, the Yoder case was a
hybrid situation.104 Thus, even though the compulsory school attendance law was
religion-neutral and generally applicable, the Amish parents were entitled to exemptions
for their children.
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Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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Applying this hybrid situations language to compulsory sex education, religious
students and parents can make a strong argument for exemptions. Indeed, if the
government cannot show that denying exemptions from sex education is necessary to
achieving a compelling governmental interest, public schools must provide exemptions to
those students who can show that sex education both substantially burdens their or their
parents’ religious exercise and impinges on another constitutional interest of theirs or
their parents.
There is a problem, however, with this argument. Because the Supreme Court has
not clarified what types of claims fall under this hybrid exception, the Circuit Courts
follow three different approaches to the hybrid exception—each approach pointing the
claimant in a different direction.
One approach applies the hybrid exception when a plaintiff articulates, in addition
to a free exercise claim, an independent constitutional interest upon which she could
prevail. The First Circuit supports this approach.105 This approach has been sharply
criticized on the basis that it does not change the substantive or procedural rights of
claimants.106
A second approach applies the hybrid exception when a plaintiff brings a
colorable claim in addition to the free exercise claim. The Tenth Circuit has applied this
105

See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995).
This approach does not seem to change the substantive rights of plaintiffs because, under this
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approach to mean that the non-free exercise claim must be serious, even though it need
not be sufficiently strong to win the case.107 The problem with this approach, however, is
that many free exercise claims could be colored to meet this requirement.108 Thus,
litigants in courts following this approach could use the hybrid exception that Smith
created to swallow the Smith rule.
A third approach does not treat the hybrid exception as an exception at all. The
Second and Sixth Circuits ignore Smith’s hybrid situations language under the premise
that it does not make sense for free exercise standards to change because of the existence
of another constitutional interest.109 Some Justices and commentators have made this
point, suggesting that Justice Scalia discussed hybrid situations in the Smith opinion not
to create a new doctrine, but rather for the sole purpose of reconciling the discrepant
outcomes in Yoder and Smith.110
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See, e.g., Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding
that claiming a hybrid exception “at least requires a colorable showing of infringement of recognized and
specific constitutional rights, rather than the mere invocation of a general right such as the right to control
the education of one's child").
108
For instance, any burden on a child’s religious exercise could be articulated under case law as a
violation of the parents’ constitutionally protected child-rearing interests. Surely, if sex education
substantially burdens a child’s religious exercise, the parents of the child could make a persuasive argument
under Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder that sex education impermissibly interferes with their right to rear their
children how they see fit.
109
See, e.g., Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that that
Smith's "language relating to hybrid claims is dicta and not binding on this court"); Kissinger v. Bd. of
Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that the proposition that the legal standard of the Free
Exercise Clause changes when a Free Exercise claim is brought with another constitutional interest is
‘completely illogical’); Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that a father’s right to
direct the education of his child does not require his son’s school to exempt him from a compulsory health
class because there is “no good reason for the standard of review [in free exercise cases] to vary simply
with the number of constitutional rights that that plaintiff asserts have been violated”).
110
See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
1109, 1121 (1990) (stating that “[o]ne suspects that the notion of ‘hybrid’ claims was created for the sole
purpose of distinguishing Yoder in this case”). Justice O’Connor raised this point in her dissenting opinion
in Smith: “The Court endeavors to escape from [these] decisions in Cantwell and Yoder by labeling them
‘hybrid’ decisions, but there is no denying that both cases expressly relied on the Free Exercise Clause, and
that we have consistently regarded those cases as part of the mainstream of our free exercise
jurisprudence.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 896.
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Due to this sharp split among the Circuits, the status of Yoder is unclear. If a
claim is litigated in a Circuit that applies either the first or the second approach, the
hybrid exception exists, but depending on the Circuit, the exception might mean that the
parents in Yoder prevailed on the basis of either: (a) their child-rearing interest alone; (b)
their free exercise claim alone; or (c) the special relationship between the two claims.
Thus, whether the Circuit follows the first or second approach might be quite significant
to a parent seeking an exemption from sex education for her child; it might mean that the
parent should claim that sex education impinges upon her child-rearing interests, or that
the parent should claim that sex education violates her or her child’s religious beliefs, or
perhaps that the parent should argue some sort of synergy of the claims.
Alternatively, if a claim is litigated in a Circuit that does not recognize the hybrid
exception, then there is the question of whether Yoder survived Smith. Because the
Yoder Court analyzed the Amish parents’ claim exclusively in terms of the Free Exercise
Clause,111 the case is probably best understood, as Justice O’Connor contended in
Smith,112 as a free exercise case. And under the Smith free exercise standard, the law at
issue in Yoder is valid.113 Therefore, if the hybrid exception does not exist, as the third
approach opines, this would mean that Yoder is no longer good law.
Where does that leave an analysis of a claim for an exemption from compulsory
sex education? If the hybrid exception exists, the analysis varies depending on the
Circuit. And if the hybrid exception does not exist, then compulsory sex education must
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The Yoder Court explicitly stated that it struck down the law because it violated the tenets of the
Amish religion. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.
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population. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
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be analyzed under Smith, meaning that students are almost certainly not constitutionally
entitled to exemptions from compulsory sex education.114 Clearly, with so much
doctrinal uncertainty in this area of constitutional law, it is impossible to analyze a
student’s constitutional claim for an exemption with any certainty.
However, despite this uncertainty, it must be emphasized that the Court has never
overruled Yoder. To the contrary, the Smith Court confirmed that Yoder was decided
correctly.115 Indeed, while the Smith Court might have reconfigured Yoder by explaining
Yoder as a hybrid situation, the Smith Court never suggested that it would have decided
Yoder differently. Thus, the narrow holding of Yoder—that a state may not compel
children to participate in an activity that threatens the existence of their parents’ religious
community—survived Smith. Accordingly, whether or not there is a hybrid exception,
the best argument for those seeking religious exemptions from sex education is to show
how similar their situation is to that of the Amish children and parents in Yoder.
2. Applying Yoder to Compulsory Sex Education
A closer examination of the facts in Yoder reveals the parallel between
compulsory sex education for some religious groups and compulsory school attendance
for the Amish. In Yoder, Amish parents claimed that Wisconsin’s compulsory school
attendance law threatened the harmony of the Amish community.116 The Amish parents
explained how, because the Amish loathe pride and value humility,117 Amish children
must avoid the competition and materialism that pervade high school life.118 For this

114

Under Smith, as stated above, a school’s decision to provide compulsory sex education is probably

valid.

115

Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 208.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 212.
116

41

reason, Wisconsin substantially burdened the Amish tradition by requiring Amish
children to attend high school.119 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger agreed with
the Amish parents that the Wisconsin law violated the Free Exercise Clause, 120 basing
his opinion on the premise that high school “places Amish children in an environment
hostile to Amish beliefs with increasing emphasis on competition in class work and
sports and with pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and ways of the peer
group.”121
Different religious groups can pose strong arguments under Yoder for exemptions
from compulsory sex education because compulsory sex education could burden some
religious beliefs in a way that is similar to how the Yoder Court found that high school
burdens Amish religious beliefs. While a discussion of all the possible ways that sex
education could offend every religious belief is beyond the pale of this paper, it might be
helpful to examine some religious objections to common themes in sex education.
A central aim of sex education is to make young people feel comfortable with
their sexual desires.122 With this aim in mind, many sex educators teach students that
homosexuality is natural and morally acceptable.123 Many religions, however, teach that
homosexuality is unnatural and therefore sinful. The Vatican, for example, teaches that
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homosexuality is sinful because it violates God’s design.124 Following the Vatican, many
Roman Catholics condemn homosexual conduct. Importantly, a person who condemns
homosexual conduct because of the Vatican’s teachings condemns homosexual conduct
for religious reasons, while a person who condemns homosexual conduct because of
social norms or individual fears condemns homosexual conduct for secular reasons.
Because a Roman Catholic can argue that her sincerely held religious beliefs are
contradicted by any suggestion that homosexuality is moral, a Roman Catholic student
can pose a strong argument that a school’s decision to discuss homosexuality in amoral
terms substantially burdens her religious beliefs. Furthermore, since a Roman Catholic
parent almost certainly has a more difficult time inculcating her child with Roman
Catholic beliefs when her child’s school expressly contradicts Roman Catholic teaching,
in many situations compulsory sex education will substantially burden the child-rearing
interests of Roman Catholic parents, just as Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance
law burdened the child-rearing interests of Amish parents.
Even if a sex education program did not discuss homosexuality, and instead
merely taught students how to engage in safe sex, many religious groups could still make
a strong case for exemptions from compulsory sex education. Again, the strongest
reaction might come from Roman Catholic students because a central tenet of Roman
Catholicism is that any intentional interruption of the natural reproductive process is an
unjustifiable violation of God’s plan,125 and a public school therefore violates a Roman
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Catholic student’s religious beliefs by forcing her to attend instruction on contraception
or abortion.
Jewish students and parents also can argue that a compulsory sex education
program that teaches family planning violates their religious beliefs. The Jewish
argument against family planning is based on the premise that some Jewish people are
taught that it is their duty, as members of the sacred covenant between God and Israel, to
produce Jewish progeny.126 Jewish parents might have a legitimate concern that by
teaching students how to have sex with minimal procreative risk public schools
effectively encourage Jewish students to have sexual relationships with non-Jewish
students, and, consequently, this increased sexual activity with non-Jewish students will
reduce the number of Jewish offspring. Thus, Jewish parents can argue that the
government’s religion-neutral instruction on family planning works against the efforts of
Jewish people to follow a Jewish imperative. Since public schools do not encourage
Jewish students to procreate with Jewish people only (and indeed public schools may not

while thwarting the divine intentions for the act.” SACRED RIGHTS: THE CASE FOR CONTRACEPTION AND
ABORTION IN WORLD RELIGIONS 67 (Daniel C. Maguire ed., Oxford University Press 2003).
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While this might be true, Jewish parents can bolster their argument against family planning with textual
support found in the Mishnah in tractate Yevamot, which some commentators have interpreted to stand for
the proposition that abortion violates Jewish law. Id. at 33.
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encourage this because of the Establishment Clause), a Jewish parent can claim that her
child must be exempt from any discussion of family planning.
A sex education class limited to a description of human sexuality still might
burden religious beliefs because some religious believers interpret their religions to mean
that sex discussion with non-believers must be avoided altogether. Some Muslims, for
example, strictly follow the Shari’ah, the code of Islamic law based on clerical
interpretation of the Koran.127 The Shari’ah has specific rules that apply to sexual
conduct, and some Islamic authorities have interpreted these rules to require punishment
for premarital sex, homosexual acts, and adultery.128 In a school where Muslims are not
the majority, sex educators of course do not incorporate these rules into the classroom
discussion. Instead, it is most often the case that American sex educators teach and
discuss sexual conduct in ways that, while typical in the United States, are foreign to
many Muslims.129 Thus, even when a public school limits sex education to a description
of human sexuality, the public school might highlight for Muslim children that their
religious laws, which are believed by Muslims to emanate from Allah, are ignored by
other people. By highlighting this, the government might suggest to Muslim students that
the government believes that Islamic law is wrong, and hence that that the Islamic God is
wrong. Muslim parents, therefore, can claim that the government threatens Islamic
beliefs by teaching sex education.
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These examples of how sex education might burden the religious beliefs of
different faiths illustrate how difficult it is for schools to establish a compulsory sex
education program that does not offend anyone’s religious beliefs. When a public school
teaches sex education, religious beliefs and state action invariably intersect. As a result,
many religious beliefs and values are drawn into question. This questioning can be quite
burdensome for many groups. Indeed, it is burdensome for a Roman Catholic student to
question the Pope, or for a Jewish student to question what her Rabbi calls a Jewish
imperative, or for a Muslim student to question the righteousness of her God.
That is not to say that sex education prohibits these students from following their
religion beliefs. There is nothing about sex education that would prevent a Roman
Catholic student from believing that homosexuality and contraception are wrong, a
Jewish student from procreating with other Jewish people, or a Muslim student from
following the Shari’ah. Nonetheless, the metaphysical questioning raised by sex
education can be quite burdensome for a believer, especially for a young believer who
has not yet developed the analytical skills to ascertain how and why her family’s beliefs
differ from those of her classmates. Moreover, sex education can lead to questioning that
might go well beyond the recesses of a student’s mind; the questioning might lead to
challenging confrontations at home, and perhaps to dramatic changes in the religious
community.
Significantly, it is precisely these changes to a religious community that
concerned the Yoder Court. The Court was not concerned about what would happen to a
few Amish children if they fraternized with other high school students or learned about
popular culture, but rather what would happen to the Amish community if all the Amish
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children in Wisconsin were exposed to non-Amish practices. That the Court was
concerned about the Amish community and not the individual is evident from its
extensive discussion of the importance of the Amish religion to the American
experience,130 the historical significance of the Amish religion,131 the danger that
compulsory education posed to the community,132 and the consistency of Amish
practices.133
Many other religious groups are similar to the Amish in these ways.
Undoubtedly, many students who strongly believe in Roman Catholicism, Judaism, or
Islam are members of traditional religious communities that have played a significant role
in American society; and, as demonstrated above, the consistently held beliefs practiced
by these communities are threatened by sex education.134 Therefore, if Yoder is still good
law, these groups, and probably many more, are constitutionally entitled to exemptions
from compulsory sex education.
In conclusion, regardless of how courts treat the hybrid exception, different
religious groups can present very strong arguments under Yoder for constitutionally
required exemptions from sex education. If the claim is litigated in a Circuit that does
130
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apply the hybrid exception, then the religious parents can simply articulate their childrearing interests as an interest in raising their children in their religious background—
much the way the Smith Court framed the parental interests at stake in Yoder. And even
if the claim is litigated in a Circuit that does not apply the hybrid exception, religious
students and parents can point to Yoder as controlling precedent. So long as Yoder is
good law,135 and so long as the claimant is a member of a religious group that resembles
the Amish in the ways emphasized by the Yoder Court, the claimant is constitutionally
entitled to an exemption from compulsory sex education—unless the government can
show that denying an exemption is necessary to serve a compelling government interest.
3. The Government’s Interest in and Means of Addressing the
Problems Resulting from Uninformed Teenage Sex
If the government can show that compulsory sex education is narrowly tailored to
meet a compelling governmental interest, then it can refuse to allow religious
exemptions. The government’s strongest interest in compulsory sex education is almost
certainly protecting students from STDs, and this is probably a compelling interest. But
the government probably cannot show that instituting compulsory sex education is
narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s compelling interest in protecting students
from STDs.
a. The government’s compelling interest in protecting students
from STDs
The Supreme Court has established that the health of its citizens rank as one of a
state’s strongest interests. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,136 the Court held that
Massachusetts’ interest in protecting the general public from smallpox was sufficiently
135
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strong to overcome a citizen’s liberty interest in not being vaccinated.137 The Court
based its ruling on the “fundamental principle that persons and property are subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the State.”138
The Court also has established that the government’s interest in protecting the
health of all its citizens can trump one citizen’s interest in exercising her religious beliefs.
In Prince v. Massachusetts,139 for instance, a minor’s legal custodian challenged a
Massachusetts child labor law prohibiting minors from selling newspapers.140 The legal
custodian and minor were both Jehovah’s Witnesses,141 and as such, they believed it was
their religious duty to spread religious material.142 In fulfilling this duty, the legal
custodian and the child distributed religious newspapers.143 After being charged under
the child labor law, the legal custodian claimed that it violated both her freedom to
exercise her religious beliefs and her right to rear the child.144 In defense of the law,
Massachusetts claimed that it was necessary to protect the health and welfare of
children.145 Balancing these interests—the legal custodian’s religious and child-rearing
rights on the one hand, and the state’s interest in protecting children from labor
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exploitation on the other146—the Court ruled that the state’s interest outweighed the legal
custodian’s interest in fulfilling a religious duty through a child.147
Based on Jacobson and Prince, the government’s interest in protecting young
people from STDs is clearly compelling.148 Some STDs are certainly as dangerous to
young people as smallpox,149 and many STDs are significantly more dangerous to young
people than is labor. Thus, the government’s interest in protecting citizens from STDs is
probably as strong as the government’s interest in protecting citizens from smallpox, and
significantly stronger than its interest in protecting young people from labor exploitation.
Accordingly, it follows that the government’s interest in preventing adolescents from
acquiring STDs150 outweighs the interest that some religious groups have in being exempt
from sex education classes.
b. Compulsory sex education as a means of protecting children
from STDs
The constitutional problem with compulsory sex education, however, is that
compulsory sex education is not as narrowly tailored in protecting children from STDs as
either smallpox vaccinations are in controlling smallpox or a child labor law is in
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Id. at 166.
Id. (declaring that “[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the
community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death”).
148
It should be noted here that some religious groups, like the Amish, do not need a high school
education in order to be productive and self-sufficient. SeeYoder, 406 U.S. at 228-29. However, no
religious group has developed a way of life that has immunized its believers from the risks of uninformed
sex. Accordingly, the government’s interest in providing sex education to all children is certainly stronger
than its interest in providing a high school education to all children.
149
HIV, like smallpox, is highly contagious. And HIV, like small pox, is fatal. See CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, YOUNG PEOPLE AT RISK: HIV/AIDS AMONG AMERICA'S YOUTH,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/facts/youth.htm.
150
At least the state’s interest in preventing people from acquiring HIV is as strong as the state’s
interest in preventing people from acquiring smallpox.
147
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protecting children from labor exploitation. There are at least three arguments why this is
so.151
First, compulsory sex education is less effective. Because sex education works
only if a person makes sexual decisions consistent with her education, a person with sex
education who ignores her education by practicing unsafe sex is not any safer from STDs
than is a person who has not had sex education. Since it seems that people who oppose
sex education will be less likely to follow sex education lessons, sex education taught to
students who oppose sex education is probably less effective than sex education taught to
students who favor sex education.152 For example, a Roman Catholic student who
opposes sex education because she rejects the use of contraception will probably not use
contraception simply because she was forced to attend sex education classes. Thus, the
marginal benefits of teaching sex education to all students over teaching only those
students who want to learn sex education are slight. Vaccinations, by contrast, are
effective even if a person who receives the vaccination opposes it or is unaware of having
received it. And if the government inoculates a person who opposes the vaccination on
religious grounds, the person cannot then dispel the vaccination. Thus, unlike sex
education, the marginal benefits of inoculating all citizens over inoculating only those
who want vaccinations are great.
Second, many people who do not take sex education classes are protected from
STDs while many people who do not receive a vaccination are not protected from the
relevant virus. Though it might be argued that basic sex information is necessary in order
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Since sex education is more like a vaccination than a labor law, this section will focus only on the
relationship between sex education and vaccinations.
152
And many people question the efficacy of sex education for those students who do not oppose it on
religious grounds.
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to have safe sex, this information may be acquired outside of sex education class for a
small fee (by buying books or renting movies) and for no monetary cost at all (by talking
to relatives or reading books at the public library). Thus, it does not follow that the
government must teach sex education in order to protect people from STDs. By contrast,
the government might have to provide vaccinations in order to protect citizens from a
virus because some people are not protected from a virus unless they receive a
vaccination, and many people without healthcare cannot obtain vaccinations.
Third, the burdens created by a vaccination and sex education are dramatically
different. While some might argue that a vaccination is more burdensome because it is
an actual invasion of the body, sex education is probably more burdensome because it is
an enduring invasion of the conscience. Sex education’s invasion does not just last the
vaccination’s few uncomfortable seconds; the sex education’s effects on a religious
person or community can be permanent. And even though a vaccination might be
burdensome to an individual who opposes vaccinations on religious grounds, there are
very few ways in which the government can protect a person from a virus without
similarly burdening the individual. However, there are many ways of preventing STD
transmission that are less burdensome than compelling students to attend sex education
class.153
Because the government does not need to teach sex education in order to protect
children from STDs, and because the government’s interest in protecting children from
STDs can be achieved through less burdensome means, compulsory sex education is not
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For example, instead of compelling students to attend sex education class, the government can
simply provide sex information in local or public school libraries. These alternatives are discussed infra as
ways in which the state can accomplish the important objective of instructing young people about sex
without substantially burdening the religious beliefs of students and parents.
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narrowly tailored. Thus, even though the government probably has a compelling interest
in protecting children from STDs, public schools are constitutionally required to exempt
from compulsory sex education those students who can show that sex education
substantially burdens her or her parent’s religious beliefs.
III. THE DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE SOLUTIONS
As discussed in Part II.A, there is very little in the U.S. Constitution suggesting
that public schools have an obligation to teach sex education. The Free Speech Clause,
the Due Process Clause, and the Establishment Clause are the only provisions in the U.S.
Constitution that arguably guarantee a right to acquire sex information. The strongest
argument that sex education supporters can make is that the Free Speech Clause compels
the government to provide access to sex information in either local or public school
libraries and prohibits the government from removing sex information books from the
public school library, and the Due Process Clause prohibits the government from
unreasonably burdening the acquisition of sex information. This argument, of course,
does not come very close to an obligation to teach sex education.
However, as discussed in Part II.B, the constitutional arguments for exemptions
from compulsory sex education are much stronger. Since sex education touches on areas
that religion traditionally has controlled, it is virtually impossible for a public school not
to offend some religious belief when it teaches sex education. Indeed, whether a public
school decides to provide comprehensive or abstinence sex education will often be
irrelevant because either form of sex education invariably draws some religious beliefs
into question. This questioning can be quite burdensome on some religious communities.
Under Yoder, the government may create this type of burden on religious communities
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only if it can show that the cause of the burden is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
state interest. And sex education is almost certainly not narrowly tailored to achieve the
government’s interest in protecting children from STDs. Therefore, if Yoder is still good
law, sex education opponents can make a very strong case for exemptions from sex
education.
Given these two premises—that the Constitution does not require public schools
to teach sex education and that the Constitution requires public schools that teach sex
education to exempt certain religious students from class—a school district pressured to
teach sex education has three options.
One option is to teach sex education without exemptions for any students. The
problem with this option is the inevitable constitutional litigation. Many school districts
have found that when they do not allow students to opt-out of sex education, high-profile
and controversial constitutional disputes follow.154 This type of litigation, won or lost,
can be quite costly—both in terms of the legal expenses and the negative publicity.155
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See, e.g., Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Ed., 289 A.2d 914 (Conn. 1971) (upholding school board's
implementation of sex education curriculum); Hobolth v. Greenway, 218 N.W.2d 98 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974)
(upholding statute authorizing sex education); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st
Cir. 1995) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the school after the school
provided a sexually explicit assembly because parents do not have a “fundamental constitutional right to
dictate the curriculum at the public school to which they have chosen to send their children”); Leebaert v.
Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2nd Cir. 2003) (upholding the constitutionality of a sex education class with an
opt-out provision). While the state might have won in these cases, appealing these disputes can be quite
costly—both in terms of the legal expenses and the negative publicity. Moreover, the constitutionality of
compulsory sex education is far from resolved because the legal standards for religious and child-rearing
rights are still developing. Accordingly, although there have been legal disputes over sex education for
more than 30 years, students and parents will continue to challenge sex education programs, even in public
schools within jurisdictions that have already considered related issues. In other words, the costs to states
could add up quickly.
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As evidence of how governments evaluate the costs of constitutional litigation, consider the Public
Expression of Religion Act of 2005, HR 2679, 109th Cong. (2005), which exempts Establishment Clause
claims from the attorney’s fee award provision in 42 U.S.C. 1988. Congress’s stated reason for proposing
this exemption is to eliminate the chilling effect that constitutional litigation imposes on state and local
officials. For further discussion of the legal and policy costs that constitutional litigation imposes on
government defendants, see Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court
Awards of Attorney's Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part One), 55 LA. L. REV. 217 (1994)
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Even in jurisdictions where courts have already considered related issues, litigation is
likely because the constitutionality of compulsory sex education is far from resolved.
And not only will there be continuous challenges, but there could soon be different
results as the doctrines for religious liberty and child-rearing rights develop. This
development could be particularly great and unpredictable in the area of religious liberty,
where state and federal statutes have joined forces with state constitutions to wage war
against Smith.156 So, even though school districts have won most of the litigation so far,
the landscape is changing quickly, and the political and financial costs could add up
quickly.
A second option is to teach sex education, but to make exemptions available for
students that satisfy certain conditions. However, there are also problems with this
option. One problem is that students will receive different information according to their
or their parents’ religious beliefs. As a result, some religious communities might not
acquire vital survival information. And not only will this lack of information harm
particular religious groups, but there is also the risk that the harmful results of one
group’s sexual ignorance will spread to others. Another problem with this option is that
offering exemptions to students on the basis of religious affiliation is sure to increase

and Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney's Fees
for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part Two), 56 LA. L. REV 1 (1995).
156
As noted supra, in response to Smith, Congress passed RFRA, which restored the strict scrutiny
framework. Then, after the Court held in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) that Congress had
overreached in using its Section 5 power to apply RFRA to the states, about twelve states enacted their own
RFRAs. See EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 977 (Foundation Press 2001). Also in response to
Smith, states have interpreted their constitutions to require pre-Smith strict scrutiny when the government
substantially burdens religious exercise. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 240-41 (Wis. 1996).
For a general discussion of how and why states have rejected Smith, see Stuart G. Parsell, Note,
Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion Under State Constitutions: A Response to Employment
Division v. Smith, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (1993).
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tension among different religious and ethnic groups—a tension that is already alarming in
many communities157—and to anger both sex education supporters and opponents.158
A third option is not to teach sex education at all. This of course means that
some public school students will never receive sex education, either formally or
informally, and that, consequently, the problems resulting from uninformed or
misinformed teen sex will continue. Though troubling—in districts where the benefits of
teaching sex education do not appear sufficiently strong so as to outweigh option one’s
costs of certain political controversy and constitutional litigation or option two’s costs of
limited efficacy and likely religious conflict—option three is the politically rational
decision.
But, while this might be the solution to the local problem posed in Part I, this is
hardly a solution to the national problem we are facing—this “solution” would only
ensure that the United States will suffer the enormous social,159 health,160 and
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See generally Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2006); LUKER, WARRING VIEWS ON SEX, supra note __.
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See supra note __, explaining why both sex education supporters and opponents often dislike optouts.
159
Though rates have decreased substantially over the last decade, teen pregnancy rates are higher in
the United States than in any other developed country. See The Alan Guttmacher Institute, Sexual and
Reproductive Health in Developed Countries: Can More Progress Be Made? (Dec. 2001), at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/summaries/euroteens_summ.pdf, *1. Between 66% and 95% of these
pregnancies are unplanned. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OSTEOPHATHIC FAMILY PHYSICIANS, DEBATE OVER
HOW TO REDUCE HIGH RATE OF TEEN PREGNANCY (2003), available at
http://www.acofp.org/member_publications/camar_02.htm. Some researchers have explained this high
percentage as “both a symptom and consequence of extreme poverty and social disorganization.” Id.
Research suggests that “adolescents are more likely than adults to suffer negative consequences from their
sexual behavior.” Elizabeth Kelts, M.D., et al. Where Are We on Teen Sex?: Delivery of Reproductive
Health Services to Adolescents by Family Physicians, 33 FAMILY MEDICINE 376 (2001).
160
In 2000, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) found that approximately half of
all new HIV infections in the United States occurred among young people under age 25, and that most of
these infections were transmitted sexually. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, YOUNG
PEOPLE AT RISK: HIV/AIDS AMONG AMERICA'S YOUTH, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/facts/youth.htm .. Recent research suggests that the health problems resulting
from uninformed teen sex are getting worse. According to a 2004 Kaiser report, approximately 65% of all
sexually transmitted infections contracted by Americans occur in people under 24, and 25% of new HIV
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economic161 problems resulting from uninformed teenage sex. For this reason, any
analysis of the constitutional problem must not be left at the descriptive level, but it also
must probe the problem normatively. We must determine whether we are willing to
accept the costs of a constitutional system committed to individual liberty (with a strong
emphasis on religious liberty) and circumscribed governmental power (with a strong
emphasis on negative rights and a correspondingly limited provision of positive rights),
and if so, what efforts we can take to minimize those costs.
That our commitment to religious liberty and limited government is a source of
the problem is highlighted when compared to the experiences and applicable
constitutional constraints in other countries. While the U.S. Constitution clearly does not
require the government to teach sex education, some have interpreted the European
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) to require member States to teach sex
education. Indeed, one commentator argues that Article 10.1 of the ECHR, which
provides the right “to receive and impart information and ideas without the interference
by public authority,” creates a right to sex information that might obligate member States
to teach sex education.162
Even more strikingly, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has interpreted
the Convention on the Right of the Child (“CRC”) to require member States to teach sex

infections occur in people under 22. Molly Masland, Carnal Knowledge: The Sex Ed Debate (2004), at
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3071001/ ..
161
A study of teenage mothers found that, within five years of pregnancy, most had dropped out of
high school and 60% were on welfare. RICHARD GREEN, SEXUAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW 184 (Harvard
University Press 1992). Over a five year period, “teenage childbearing costs to public programs totaled
$130.3 billion and it was estimated that $48.1 billion could have been saved if each birth had been
postponed until the mother was at least 20 years of age.” AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OSTEOPHATHIC FAMILY
PHYSICIANS, DEBATE OVER HOW TO REDUCE HIGH RATE OF TEEN PREGNANCY (2003), available at
http://www.acofp.org/member_publications/camar_02.htm ..
162
See OF INNOCENCE AND AUTONOMY: CHILDREN, SEX, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 168 (Eric Heinze ed.,
Ashgate 2000).
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education. In fact, the Committee has interpreted three provisions of the CRC to mean
that member States have a duty to educate adolescents about sex,163 and the Committee
has applied this interpretation to its recommendations to member States. For example, in
a recommendation to the Government of Uganda, the Committee advised Uganda to
“pursue and strengthen its family planning and reproductive health education
programmes, including for adolescents.164 Pursuant to its recommendations, the
Committee has demanded information from member States regarding their compliance
with CRC’s sex education mandate. Indeed, the Committee requested information from
Ireland regarding “what steps the Government had taken with regard to those school
teachers who had refused to teach sex education, whether they were permitted to keep
their posts, and, if so, how the sex education curricular were taught.”165 The United
States, of course, is not a party to either the ECHR or the CRC.
Moreover, while the U.S. Constitution probably does not permit either the federal,
state, or local governments to compel students to attend sex education class if attendance
substantially burdens their or their parents’ religious beliefs, the ECHR probably permits
member States to compel attendance so long as there is a rational basis for doing so.
Article 9.2 of the ECHR allows member States to impinge on religious freedom if doing
so is necessary for the protection of public order or morality.166 The European Court of
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The three provisions are: (1) Article 13.1, which provides a right “to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds”; (2) Article 24.1, which provides a right “to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of health”; and (3) Article 24.2(f) ,which requires States to “develop preventive
health care, guidance for parents and family planning education and services.” Id.
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COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, 16th Session, CRC/C/69 (1997).
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The text states: “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.” EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf.
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Human Rights has interpreted Article 9.2 under the doctrine of “margin of appreciation.”
Professor Drinan writes that, applied to religious liberty, the doctrine of margin of
appreciation “assumes at its discretion that the national lawmaking groups in Europe got
it right when they decided issues of religious freedom.”167 This doctrine is similar to
rational basis review in U.S. constitutional law.168 Thus, a sex education law that violates
a person’s religious beliefs is presumed valid under the ECHR, whereas such a law might
have to satisfy something like strict scrutiny under the U.S. Constitution.
With this flexibility, many European nations require their public schools to teach
sex education, and not coincidentally, these nations have experienced the greatest success
in reducing teen pregnancy and STD transmission. 169 The experiences of these European
nations highlight the relationship between the U.S. Constitution and the teen sex
problems in the United States, and how this relationship will constrain the United States
as it tries to address its sex education problem.
That brings us to the normative question: Should we accept these constraints?
This is, of course, a big question that cannot be resolved here. A few notes, however,
should be made about this issue. Because constitutional doctrines guaranteeing robust
religious liberty and limited government often work for our benefit, many people approve
of, and some favor strengthening, the doctrines creating the particular result addressed in
this Article. Lest we want our courts to reduce constitutional provisions to particularized
social utility analyses, we should be careful about urging courts to adopt a different
167
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country with the lowest teen birthrate, has required sex education longer than any other country. See The
Alan Guttmacher Institute, Sexual and Reproductive Health in Developed Countries: Can More Progress
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approach with respect to sex education than it has applied to other religious liberty issues.
Put more concretely, if we feel that France has it wrong and that religious liberty means
that at all public schools a Jewish boy has the right to wear a yarmulke and a Muslim girl
has a right to wear religious headdress, we should also accommodate sex education
opponents, even though doing so has greater and more deleterious social consequences
than accommodating religious headgear. As shown time and time again, courts creating
constitutional doctrine according to social exigency are doomed to fail as expositors of
the law.170
Moreover, whatever our particular feelings about these constitutional constraints,
it is quite apparent that this is a question that our representatives have answered in the
affirmative. Congress, state courts, and state legislatures agree that religious liberty is
something that we must cherish, and something that the U.S. Supreme Court has not
taken seriously enough. And, given the nation’s growing commitment to religion, there
is reason to believe that our representatives have responded to how a majority of the
nation feels.
So, as a practical matter, if we are to deal with this problem, we are going to have
to work within these constraints. Taking the following three actions is a good place to
start. First, the government must make sex information available to those young people
who want it. This can be accomplished by providing sex information in public libraries.
As discussed in Part I.A.2, public schools are forbidden from removing sex information
that they have in their libraries on the basis of the information’s controversial content.
170

Some of the Court’s worst decisions ignore broad constitutional rules in the name of public
necessity. See, e.g., Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding that the Fifth Amendment’s
equal protection requirement that the federal government treat all races equally does not prohibit the U.S.
military from restricting access to areas on the basis of race because ”[p]ressing public necessity may
sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions“).
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Students and parents will not have any success challenging this requirement on free
exercise grounds since the mere availability of sex information in the library does not
substantially burden a person’s religious beliefs.
Second, the government must make contraception available to young people.
Public schools can do this by providing free contraception in health offices, along with
information on how to use contraception. If students object to the use of contraception,
they could simply decide not to acquire or read about contraception. Because the free
contraception and information about contraception are acquired voluntarily, religious
students and parents would almost certainly lose in a claim that the government has
violated their religious beliefs or familial privacy.171
Finally, the government must promote dialogue about adolescent sex with the aim
of forming a workable sex education program for all students. This dialogue can be
initiated through school assemblies and panel discussions in which different student
groups explain their viewpoints on adolescent sex. As a result of this dialogue, school
districts will have a clearer understanding of how sex education could be taught without
excessively burdening or alienating members of their respective religious communities.
CONCLUSION
What makes the Constitution so fascinating is its protean quality. While
announcing broad legal and moral propositions, the Constitution provides more than a
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See, e.g., Curtis v. School Comm, 652 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Mass. 1995) (holding that “[b]ecause . . .
the [condom availability] program lacks any degree of coercion or compulsion in violation of the plaintiffs'
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political philosophy; it is not just abstract or theoretical; it is also relentlessly practical,
touching mundane matters that affect all of our lives, even such local decisions as the one
covered in this Article—that of whether to teach the community’s children about sex.
And, because political actors must always consider its weight, the Constitution, in
reaching into our lives, also reaches beyond its borders, inserting itself into political
decisionmaking as a factor to be considered, even when its text does not clearly dictate
the conclusion. The area outside its circumference can rule our lives just as if it lay
within its nucleus.
As some of the Court’s conservative members have admonished their liberal
colleagues, the Constitution does not authorize the federal judiciary to cure all of the
nation’s problems. Indeed, the Constitution does not speak to every political problem.
And, as demonstrated in Parts II and III, not only does the Constitution not solve every
social problem, it creates some too. For instance, we have discovered here how, by
making the provision of sex education more difficult for public schools, the Constitution
can discourage schools from selecting what is probably the most effective policy solution
to a problem.
Determining what to do when the Constitution creates social problems raises
fundamental questions about what we want from our Constitution and judiciary. Some
might be tempted to say that we must interpret the Constitution differently to reach the
right conclusion—in this case, to encourage public schools to teach sex education. After
all, the Constitution, as stated above, is not merely an abstract piece of political
philosophy, but rather a practical document, and as such we must be able to shape it to
meet our political needs. Others, of course, inveigh against this idea of politics seducing
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the judiciary into interpreting a living Constitution. But, whatever the merits of these
warring interpretive approaches, it is clear that we must develop greater care in
describing, and less deference in criticizing, a document that can be a source of social
problems.
We must learn how to identify what is wrong with this document and those
charged with interpreting it, and we must find a way of settling whether we are willing to
accept these wrongs. In the sex education context, if we are willing to accept these
problems we must develop policies that, like the ones discussed at the end of Part III,
work within the constraints. And if not, we must consider whether in addressing these
problems we are going to follow the laborious Article V process to amend these
constraints, or if we should consider other alternatives, such as creating new legal
doctrines concerning familial rights and religious liberty. Only through this dialogue can
we determine our needs and limitations, and consequently develop the policies that
effectively address our problems.
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